CONCERNING A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Abstract

Abstract : Even if the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions should be resolved favorably from the US point of view, and even if a comprehensive test ban treaty were totally verifiable, US concurrence would still be a serious mistake. To think that a US-USSR ban on nuclear testing would result in arms control and nuclear non-proliferation is unwise. Arms competition between the US and the USSR is inevitable as long as arms are a fact of life. Limitations on numbers and costs can only be achieved through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and agreements on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. As for non-proliferation, a ban on US and USSR nuclear tests will not insure a halt to worldwide nuclear development. Experience with the Limited Test Ban Treaty has shown this to be true. Only if all nations agree could we be reasonably hopeful that a comprehensive test ban treaty would aid nonproliferation efforts. We have been able to deter nuclear war for more than 30 years. During that time, our conventional forces and our allies have been able to operate under the nuclear umbrella furnished by US strategic nuclear forces. This deterrence is based upon assurances that US forces could survive a first strike and still inflict severe retaliatory damage. In other words, it is based on a high level of confidence in the reliability of the force. Without nuclear testing, this reliability cannot be assured nor maintained. Weapon system capability would erode; the capability of nuclear weapon laboratories would erode; and our capability to improve the force would erode. There are those who will say that safeguards would prevent these erosions, just as the Limited Test Ban Treaty safeguards have resulted in a strong US nuclear program since 1963. However, these safeguards would be without substance under a comprehensive test ban treaty.