Abstract
When they assess competing theories political scientists typically rely exclusively and naively on criteria of empirical performance. They have correspondingly little to say about conceptual problems and seem generally unaware of the extent to which their assessments of empirical performance are parasitic on conceptual commitments. This, in turn, hinders their ability to both persuasively conduct and critically assess substantive research. I use four decades of research on political culture as a vehicle for demonstrating how conceptual problems pose obstacles to progress in political science.
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