Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation

Abstract

Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999). A number of issues can be distinguished: (1) Is there an a priori entailment from microphysical truths to ordinary macroscopic truths? (2) If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? (3) If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, is physicalism about the phenomenal false? (4) Is there an a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths? We hold that the first three questions should be answered positively (with some qualifications to be outlined). Block and Stalnaker hold that the first three questions should be answered negatively. Their central strategy is to argue for a negative answer to the first question, and to use this conclusion to argue for a negative answer to the second and third questions. They argue that truths about water and about life, for example, are not entailed a priori by microphysical truths, but that this is no bar to the reductive explanation and physical constitution of water and of life. In this paper, we will address Block and Stalnaker's arguments for a negative answer to the first three questions, while remaining neutral on the fourth. We will proceed by first giving an independent defense of a positive answer to the first question. This makes the ensuing reply to Block and Stalnaker more straightforward, and also makes the discussion accessible to those unfamiliar with the literature.