Abstract
Abstract This chapter does three things. First, it discusses what innateness is, comparing our own view to two nearby views, and defending it against the charge that, because there are so many accounts of what innateness is, the whole notion should just be abandoned. Second, it provides an overview of theories of concepts and different ways of drawing the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction. Finally, it argues that the status of concept nativism isn’t hostage to any particular view about what concepts are or any particular view about how the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction should be drawn. Contrary to a tempting way of thinking about the status of concept nativism, it is both possible and preferable to remain neutral on the question of what the correct theory of concepts is in building a case for concept nativism.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
