Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions of Autonomy

Abstract

Freedom of choice is an important liberal ideal, both in itself and as a constituent of the ideal of autonomy. Choice and autonomy in this way mutually reinforce one another: we value autonomy in part because of the freedom to choose that it validates, and we value free choice in part because it contributes to our autonomy. However, the conception of choice that plays this normative role largely originates in the theory of rational choice, the area in which choice received greatest attention and was given the most detailed and rigorous articulation. That conception of choice, at least in its broad outline, is often taken for granted in normative discourse in general, and in discussions of autonomy in particular. The basic tenets of rational choice theory have been subjected to thorough and well-known criticisms,' but these focus for the most part on the descriptive inadequacies of that approach.2 My interest is rather with the normative aspect of rational choice-with the kind of ideal of free choice it projects and with the role it plays in shaping conceptions of autonomy. I begin by observing some inherent frustrations that are bound up with the dominant conception of choice. In the second section I point to a number of familiar experiences from which I extrapolate a conception of choice I call 'willing', that is diametrically opposed to the dominant conception. In the third section I present some considerations that make 'willing' a more suitable con-