Conceptional considerations for a German influenza pandemic preparedness plan.

Abstract

A pandemic appearance of influenza A virus must be expected at any time. The limitations of health preserving and life-saving resources, which will inevitably be reached in the event of a pandemic, will be accompanied by ethical and possibly social conflicts, which can be lessened or resolved only through precautionary planning, clearly specified competencies and transparent decisions within a social consensus. In case of a shortage of vaccines and virostatic agents, decisions will have to be made with regard to the segment of the population that absolutely must be vaccinated. It is currently estimated that a (monovalent) vaccine developed for a new pandemic strain would only suffice for the single vaccination of approximately half of the German population after a year; only 10-14 million vaccine dosages would be available to provide basic immunization and single boosters to personnel required to maintain basic medical care and essential infrastructure after half a year. In the event of local influenza outbreaks, antiviral chemotherapeutic agents could be used to close the gap until a vaccine can become effective. Even if suitable influenza vaccines and virostatic agents are not sufficiently available at the start of a pandemic, it is still possible to at least prevent an outbreak of two of the most feared secondary infections that accompany influenza: pneumococcal pneumonia or meningitis and illnesses resulting from Haemophilus influenzae. Agreement still needs to be reached with manufacturers for guaranteeing the necessary vaccine production or ensuring that they have a sufficient stock to meet the minimum demand for antiviral agents and agents for symptomatic treatment.