Abstract
Concept-individuating possession conditions constitute one of the fundamental, albeit rather unattended, polemical territories between Fregean and anti-individualistic standpoints. In this paper, I outline a compatibilist theory of cognitive value that encompasses both anti-individualistic and individualistic possession conditions. I argue that this general approach to the compatibility of Fregean and anti-individualistic accounts of concept possession suffices to call into question the claims that cognitive value must have deference and transparency among its fundamental features.
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