Conceiving a New Right to Procreate

Abstract

The chapters of Holm and Revel in this book demand the establishment of a clear and uncontroversial form for right to procreate. Their chapters imply the need of a framework for regulation, and indicate the need for a basis to judge the developments of reproductive techniques, especially as a result of the changing positions of men and women in the reproductive process. Holm’s chapter sets out that having a liberty to choose does not yet amount to an effective freedom, and he questions the effects of medicalisation. His chapter leads to questions about how to we can reconcile liberty and freedom, and, in the light of the medicalisation, which framework we would best place them in. Whereas Holm avoids talking about rights, his considerations and conclusions demand for a basic starting point, a minimum guarantee. Revel elaborates on the state of the art of new reproductive techniques, and his conclusion touches upon the boundaries of law and ethics. Revel’s chapter requires us to think about the availability of these techniques; what the shifting position of men and women would mean for this assessment, and whether there is a right to these techniques. This chapter seeks to create the basic starting point that these chapters need: A notion that could harmonise law and ethics better than the current conception, which is vague and we try to avoid referring to as a result of its complexity. This new notion tries to do that by dissecting the process of reproduction until reaching the most basic and bare standard that could provide protection: the capacity-based standard. In a minimalistic conception, my notion is aimed at preventing randomized availability of reproductive techniques, addresses the ambiguities in regulation as a result of their development, as apprehended by Holm and Revel, and offers a framework for the many issues that the field entails.