Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstract

I want to take on the question of what a class of arguments, usually called the Conceivability Arguments, have to say about the mindbody problem. These arguments have two different versions. In one version, considerations of conceivability are taken to support the claim that phenomenal consciousness is not identical to, realized by, or supervenient on physical properties (for example, Kripke 1972, Nagel 1974, Robinson 1993, White 1986, Jackson 1998, and Chalmers 1996). According to the other version, there is an explanatory gap between phenomenal and physical levels of description that does not exist with respect to other higher-level descriptions and that may have metaphysical ramifications.' My claim is that these arguments do not succeed in establishing their conclusions. That is because (and I take this to be the primary lesson of the Conceivability Arguments) what they reveal does not have to do with phenomenal consciousness itself; but rather with the nature of phenomenal concepts. In what follows, I will focus on the most elaborate and sophisticated version of the Conceivability Argument for dualism. First I provide a general exposition of the structure of Conceivability Arguments, then I proceed to describe in greater detail Frank Jackson's and David Chalmers's new Conceivability Argument. Finally I construct a reductio that at the same time reveals where the arguments went wrong.