Abstract
In this paper we explore the aggregate consequences of three simple individual choice rules in a simulated society in which the interaction between pairs of actors is constituted as a Pnsoner's Dilemma (PDG). After several simulations under different conditions, the most important conclusion is that in highly competitive PDG settings, using a competitive type of social comparison for performance evaluation, cooperative behavior is maintained in large groups. There remain, however, several findings that need further study before we better understand the relation between individual heuristics and their global consequences. Keywords: Prisoner's Dilemma, simulation, game theory, social comparison.
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