Computer misuse and information leakage

Abstract

While police services and businesses across the country spend large amounts of money on protecting their computer networks from the external world, it is contended that the insider presents the greatest threat to police systems. The threat from external sources is well documented and catered for by IT departments designing secure systems, constantly monitoring perimeter security and updating firewalls and anti-malware products. These measures do an efficient job in protecting the networks, to the extent that there are very few known incidents of data loss from hacking UK policing systems. However, there are daily instances of data loss from the activity of those people who have legitimate access to police systems and data – ‘the insider’. The Metropolitan Police Directorate of Professional Standards estimates that information misuse is a significant factor in their anti-corruption investigations. It accounts for over 80 per cent in these investigations. Information leakage is the single most common type of corrupt activity. A part of this growing problem is the move from closed access to intelligence, to a position where all police forces have computerized intelligence systems, with a greater focus on intelligence-led policing, and access being granted to a wider variety of staff (Ratcliffe, 2008). It is not just intelligence databases, person and vehicle checks that are sources of information leakage; there is also financial information from credit agencies, and access to communication data through the telecommunications industry, all of which can potentially be accessed and misused by police employees. In recent years, access to police intelligence has developed to sharing of information with partner agencies as it became increasingly recognized that the police could not solve crime alone (Maguire, 2000). Mobility solutions now move data from the static network to mobile data systems and handheld devices, producing greater challenges in protecting data. Intelligence sharing is further being extended across all police services by the introduction of the Police National Database. Where previously there were a limited number of officers able to access sensitive intelligence, wider access to data now means that criminals have an easier route to access staff they can corrupt to obtain data. Police information is the most valuable asset of the service and is the subject of constant corrupt attacks on a daily basis. Protecting thatinformation was succinctly summed up in the HMIC report Police Integrity, which stated:Information and intelligence is the lifeblood of policing, and therefore requires protection. This will only occur if there is a constant presumption its security is at risk. . . . Far greater emphasis should be placed on a ‘need to know’ culture and every effort made to protect intelligence, both by electronic means and by rigorous auditing, integrity testing and dip sampling.