Computationally Efficient Pricing and Benefit Distribution Mechanisms for Incentivizing Stable Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading

Abstract

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a promising market paradigm toward maximizing the value of distributed energy resources (DERs) for electricity prosumers, by enabling direct energy trading among them. However, state-of-the-art P2P mechanisms either fail to adequately incentivize prosumers to participate, prevent prosumers from accessing the highest achievable monetary benefits, or suffer severely from the curse of dimensionality. This article proposes two computationally efficient mechanisms to construct a stable grand coalition of prosumers participating in P2P trading, founded on cooperative game-theoretic principles. The first one involves a benefit distribution scheme inspired by the core tâtonnement process while the second involves a novel pricing mechanism based on the solution of a single linear program. The performance of the proposed mechanisms is validated against state-of-the-art mechanisms through numerous case studies using real-world data. The results demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms exhibit superior computational performance than the nucleolus and are superior to the rest of the examined mechanisms in incentivizing prosumers to remain in the grand coalition.