Abstract
Research on social cognition has fruitfully applied computational modeling approaches to explain how observers understand and reason about others’ mental states. By contrast, there has been less work on modeling observers’ understanding of emotional states. We propose an intuitive theory framework to studying affective cognition—how humans reason about emotions—and derive a taxonomy of inferences within affective cognition. Using this taxonomy, we review formal computational modeling work on such inferences, including causal reasoning about how others react to events, reasoning about unseen causes of emotions, reasoning with multiple cues, as well as reasoning from emotions to other mental states. In addition, we provide a roadmap for future research by charting out inferences—such as hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning about emotions—that are ripe for future computational modeling work. This framework proposes unifying these various types of reasoning as Bayesian inference within a common “intuitive Theory of Emotion.” Finally, we end with a discussion of important theoretical and methodological challenges that lie ahead in modeling affective cognition.
Highlights
Recent developments in computational cognitive modeling have allowed researchers to specify and test precise hypotheses about how people make inferences about their social world
In this paper we have outlined a framework for understanding affective cognition as inference within an intuitive theory of emotion
We derived a taxonomy of inferences (Table 1), and we have discussed these inferences both with respect to recent work in computationally modeling affective cognition, as well as future challenges for modeling each of these inferences
Summary
Recent developments in computational cognitive modeling have allowed researchers to specify and test precise hypotheses about how people make inferences about their social world These include inferences about what others desire and believe about the world (e.g., Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017; Goodman et al, 2006), what others mean when they use language to communicate (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016; Goodman & Stuhlm€uller, 2013), and what future decisions others might make (Jara-Ettinger, Gweon, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2016; Jern & Kemp, 2015). We provide a roadmap for future research, by highlighting inferences that have yet to be studied computationally, and by discussing important theoretical and methodological challenges that lie ahead
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