Abstract
What counts as a philosophical issue in computational cognitive science? This chapter briefly reviews possible answers before focusing on a specific subset of philosophical issues. These surround challenges that have been raised by philosophers regarding the scope of computational models of cognition. The arguments suggest that there are aspects of human cognition that may, for various reasons, resist explanation or description in terms of computation. The primary targets of these “no go” arguments have been semantic content, phenomenal consciousness, and central reasoning. This chapter reviews the arguments and considers possible replies. It concludes by highlighting the differences between the arguments, their limitations, and how they might contribute to the wider project of estimating the value of ongoing research programs in computational cognitive science.
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