Computational Account of Emotion, an Oxymoron?

Gordana Dodig Crnkovic,Alexander Almér,Rickard Von Haugwitz

doi:10.3390/isis-summit-vienna-2015-t9.2004

Abstract

In this work we address the belief that cognitive processes such as emotions cannot be modelled computationally. We base our argument on info-computational naturalist approach to cognition, where computation is understood as information processing on several levels of organisation of cognitive agency, and where an agent is defined as an entity capable to act on its own behalf. We also argue that Daniel Kahneman’s fast and slow thinking systems can be explained within our model. In doing so we connect information, computation and cognition as a dynamic triangular relationship.

Highlights

We take a broadly naturalist stance toward mental phenomena such as intentionality and allegedly subjective and qualitative aspects pertaining to phenomenal consciousness, in e.g. emotions and sensory experience
Emotions and feelings are occasionally excluded from cognition, and it is often argued that cognitive processes are computational in the way computation is understood as symbol processing, wherefore emotions and feeling cannot be computational phenomena
We argue that feelings and emotions naturally belong to cognition and even evolutionary precede symbol-manipulating cognition

Summary

Extended Abstract

Rickard von Haugwitz 1, Gordana Dodig Crnkovic 2,* and Alexander Almér 3 1-3 Chalmers University of Technology and University of Gothenburg, Sweden / Department of Applied IT, 412 96 Gothenburg, Sweden. Accepted: Abstract In this work we address the belief that cognitive processes such as emotions cannot be modelled computationally. We base our argument on info-computational naturalist approach to cognition, where computation is understood as information processing on several levels of organisation of cognitive agency, and where an agent is defined as an entity capable to act on its own behalf. We argue that Daniel Kahneman’s fast and slow thinking systems can be explained within our model. In doing so we connect information, computation and cognition as a dynamic triangular relationship

Introduction

Naturalism and its Critique

Problem with Qualia

Cognition as Computational Process

Computational Account of Emotions and Kahneman