Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Playeri¾?1 the leader first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Playeri¾?2 the follower plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential i.e., extensive-form games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
