Computation as Mechanism

Abstract

AbstractThe mechanistic account has evolved into a formidable theory of physical computation, and is the dominant view of computation today. The chapter focuses on Gualtiero Piccinini’s account, which is the most comprehensive and detailed theory of physical computation to date. According to this theory, computation is a functional mechanism. Its teleological function is to manipulate vehicles based solely on differences between different portions of the vehicles according to a rule defined over the vehicles. After presenting the account, the chapter highlights its two main shortcomings. One is that computational explanations do not sit squarely with the mechanistic framework. The other is that the main criteria of the account—rules, medium-independence, and teleological functions—do not appear to adequately distinguish computing from non-computing systems. The conclusion is that, despite its obvious virtues, the mechanistic account falls short of satisfying the key classification and explanation desiderata of an account of computation.