Abstract

Collaborative spectrum sensing (CSS) was envisioned to improve the reliability of spectrum sensing in centralized cognitive radio networks (CRNs). However, secondary users (SUs)’ changeable environment and ease of compromise make CSS vulnerable to security threats, which further mislead the global decision making and degrade the overall performance. A popular attack in CSS is the called spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack. In the SSDF attack, malicious cognitive users (MUs) send false sensing results to the fusion center, which significantly degrades detection accuracy. In this paper, a comprehensive reputation-based security mechanism against dynamic SSDF attack for CRNs is proposed. In the mechanism, the reliability of SUs in collaborative sensing is measured with comprehensive reputation values in accordance with the SUs’ current and historical sensing behaviors. Meanwhile a punishment strategy is presented to revise the reputation, in which a reward factor and a penalty factor are introduced to encourage SUs to engage in positive and honest sensing activities. The whole mechanism focuses on ensuring the correctness of the global decision continuously. Specifically, the proposed security scheme can effectively alleviate the effect of users’ malicious behaviors on network decision making, which contributes greatly to enhancing the fairness and robustness of CRNs. Considering that the attack strategy adopted by MUs has been gradually transforming from simplicity, fixedness and singleness into complexity, dynamic and crypticity, we introduce two dynamic behavior patterns (true to false and then to true (TFT) and false to true and then to false (FTF)) to further validate the effectiveness of our proposed defense mechanism. Abundant simulation results verify the rationality and validity of our proposed mechanism.

Highlights

  • With the rapid development of wireless services and applications, the conventional static spectrum management policy inevitably causes scarcity in specific spectrum bands

  • Considering that the attack strategy adopted by malicious cognitive users (MUs) has been gradually transforming from simplicity, fixedness and singleness into complexity, dynamic and crypticity, we introduce two dynamic behavior patterns (true to false and to true (TFT) and false to true and to false (FTF)) to further validate the effectiveness of our proposed defense mechanism

  • We investigate the impact of malicious users exerted on the collaborative sensing when the two dynamic behavior patterns introduced in Section 2.2 are used

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Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of wireless services and applications, the conventional static spectrum management policy inevitably causes scarcity in specific spectrum bands. In [9], a soft reputation-based sensing scheme was presented by modeling the operative mode of PU as a renewal process These two schemes can still work availably even in the presence of a large number of malicious users. To target the aforementioned problems in the CSS, this paper establishes a comprehensive reputation-based security mechanism against dynamic SSDF attack patterns for CRNs. each SU is assigned one comprehensive reputation by the FC, and the reliability of SUs in collaborative sensing is measured with comprehensive reputation in accordance with SUs’ historical sensing behaviors. Our scheme maintains a satisfactory sensing performance even under the circumstance that a large portion of malicious cognitive users exists in the network and employs complex attack behavior patterns.

Network Architecture
Dynamic Attack Behavior Patterns
TFT Behavior Pattern
FTF Behavior Pattern
Comprehensive Reputation-Based Security Mechanism
Current Reliability
Historical Reputation
Punishment Strategy
Reward Factor
Penalty Factor
Calculation of the CR Value
Reliable Nodes’ Credibility Verification
Weight Allocation
Measurement Combining Stage
The Mechanism Flow
Numerical and Simulation Results
The Sensing Performance under AO Attack
The Sensing Performance under TFT Attack
The Sensing Performance under FTF Attack
Findings
Conclusions

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