Abstract

AbstractJohn Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge – to an impartial spectator account: (a) the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device that does not take seriously the distinction between persons; (b) the account does not guarantee that the principles of justice will be derived from it; (c) the notion of impartiality in the account is the wrong one, since it does not define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves; (d) the account would offer a comprehensive, rather than a political, form of liberalism. The narrow aim of the article is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's impartial spectator account can rise to Rawls's challenges. The broader aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political form of liberalism.

Highlights

  • John Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge – to an impartial spectator account: (a) the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device that does not take seriously the distinction between persons; (b) the account does not guarantee that the principles of justice will be derived from it; (c) the notion of impartiality in the account is the wrong one, since it does not define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves; (d) the account would offer a comprehensive, rather than a political, form of liberalism

  • The broader aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political form of liberalism

  • The ambitions of political liberalism are such that political principles are justified by appeals to ideas that are already implicit in democratic society rather than by a comprehensive doctrine of the good

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Summary

Introduction

In his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge on Rawls’s behalf – to an impartial spectator framework, thereby rendering it an inviable alternative to his own contractarian framework for developing principles of justice. First, Rawls raises a “utilitarian challenge”:2 since, according to a utilitarian view of justice, it does not matter how the sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals – as long as the correct distribution yields maximum fulfillment – one could “adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man”; this task is performed, according to Rawls, by the impartial spectator, who organizes “the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire.” So insofar as the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device, this spectator fuses all of the relevant persons into one. Relatedly, Rawls raises a “wrong type of impartiality challenge”: the notion of impartiality in the impartial spectator account is the wrong one, since, unlike Rawls’s original position account, it does not “define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves” (TJ 165), but rather from the standpoint of the impartial spectator. One can add a “wrong type of liberalism challenge” on Rawls’s behalf: since, according to Rawls’s understanding of the impartial spectator, political principles are justified by appealing to a larger framework of values – maximizing utility (in the form of desire satisfaction) – the emerging account is one of comprehensive, rather than political, liberalism.. The broad aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account, in conjunction with some of Smith’s other views, offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political, rather than a comprehensive, form of liberalism. My “broad aim” is limited to showing that there is space to develop an interesting Smithian version of political liberalism and to gesture at the principles of justice that are likely to be derived from this framework, principles that are Rawlsian in nature

The impartial spectator and justice: preliminary remarks
Rawls and Smith: analogies
The impartial spectator and the principles of justice
Responding to Rawls’s challenges
The case for political liberalism
Conclusion
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