Abstract
Various electronic devices are increasingly being connected to the Internet. Meanwhile, security problems, such as fake silicon chips, still exist. The significance of verifying the authenticity of these devices has led to the proposal of side-channel authentication. Side-channel authentication is a promising technique for enriching digital authentication schemes. Motivated by the fact that each cryptographic device leaks side-channel information depending on its used secret keys, cryptographic devices with different keys can be distinguished by analyzing the side-channel information leaked during their calculation. Based on the original side-channel authentication scheme, this paper adapts an ID-based authentication scheme that can significantly increase the authentication speed compared to conventional schemes. A comprehensive study is also conducted on the proposed ID-based side-channel authentication scheme. The performance of the proposed authentication scheme is evaluated in terms of speed and accuracy based on an FPGA-based AES implementation. With the proposed scheme, our experimental setup can verify the authenticity of a prover among 2 70 different provers within 0.59 s; this could not be handled effectively using previous schemes.
Highlights
Nowadays, wearable embedded technology is being increasingly used under the rapid development of electronic devices
An ID-based authentication scheme was adopted for side-channel authentication
The performance of the side-channel authentication was evaluated in terms of the authentication speed and authentication accuracy
Summary
Wearable embedded technology is being increasingly used under the rapid development of electronic devices. The users and the embedded computing systems are connected to the Internet and exposed to various security threats, such as fake silicon chips. As a fundamental method against these security threats, the authenticity of these electronic devices has to be verified carefully. Side-channel leakage has received much attention since it can be used to perform key-recovery attacks against cryptographic implementations [2,3]. Cryptographic hardware with a unique secret key leaks unique key-dependent side-channel information under a given challenge. The idea of side-channel authentication is to measure and analyze this side-channel information to verify whether the used secret key is the pre-shared one
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
