Abstract
In this chapter, Rawls’s two major works are examined with a particular focus on the concept of neutrality. While Rawls admits that his Theory of Justice is based on autonomy as a comprehensive doctrine, in Political Liberalism he tries to avoid this. However, even the later Rawls is unable to avoid a mild form of comprehensive or autonomy-based liberalism. It seems impossible (but also not necessary) to give a neutral justification for a neutral (antiperfectionist) state policy. Based on this conclusion, I propose that autonomy-based liberalism is a more consistent basis for an antiperfectionist policy than is Rawls’s political (noncomprehensive) liberalism.
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