Abstract
The principle of compositionality claims that the content of a complex concept is determined by its constituent concepts and the way in which they are composed. However, for prototype concepts this principle is often too rigid. Blurring the division between conceptual composition and belief update has therefore been suggested (Hampton and Jönsson 2012). Inspired by this idea, we develop a normative account of how belief revision and meaning composition should interact in modifications such as “red apple” or “pet hamster”. We do this by combining the well-known selective modification model (Smith et al. Cognitive science 12(4):485–527 1988) with the rules of Bayesian belief update. Moreover, we relate this model to systems of defeasible reasoning as discussed in the field of artificial intelligence.
Highlights
IntroductionThe prototype theory of concepts, which goes back to various influential papers by Eleanor Rosch and colleagues (cf. Rosch 1973, 1978; Rosch et al 1976; Rosch and Mervis 1975), emphasises that most natural language concepts are not caputured by universal definitional features but in terms of similarity to salient, that is, typical exemplars, or in terms of typical properties, which most category members possess
The prototype theory of concepts, which goes back to various influential papers by Eleanor Rosch and colleagues, emphasises that most natural language concepts are not caputured by universal definitional features but in terms of similarity to salient, that is, typical exemplars, or in terms of typical properties, which most category members possess
Such work is still useful for the empirical investigation of prototype composition insofar as it delineates the rational aspect in the likelihood ratings of modified and unmodified sentences
Summary
The prototype theory of concepts, which goes back to various influential papers by Eleanor Rosch and colleagues (cf. Rosch 1973, 1978; Rosch et al 1976; Rosch and Mervis 1975), emphasises that most natural language concepts are not caputured by universal definitional features but in terms of similarity to salient, that is, typical exemplars, or in terms of typical properties, which most category members possess. For example, use functional attribute value structures like Smith et al (1988) in their well-known selective modification model or Barsalou (1992) in his frame account. Hampton and Jonsson (2012) do not suggest a formal model with computable results Rather, they describe several empirical aspects of concept composition as a non-logical form of reasoning. The selective modification model of Smith et al (1988) ( SMM) is a more sophisticated approach to modification, which is specially construed for prototype concepts It represents prototypes as weighted attribute value structures of categories. Such work is still useful for the empirical investigation of prototype composition insofar as it delineates the rational aspect in the likelihood ratings of modified and unmodified sentences It can offer a normative background against which empirical results can be compared. We reconsider the merits and limitations of our model
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