Abstract
Power side-channel attacks allow an adversary to efficiently and effectively steal secret information (e.g., keys) by exploiting the correlation between secret data and runtime power consumption, hence posing a serious threat to software security, particularly cryptographic implementations. Masking is a commonly used countermeasure against such attacks, which breaks the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel leaks via randomization. In a nutshell, a variable is represented by a vector of shares armed with random variables, called masking encoding , on which cryptographic computations are performed. While compositional verification for the security of masked cryptographic implementations has received much attention because of its high efficiency, existing compositional approaches either use implicitly fixed pre-conditions that may not be fulfilled by state-of-the-art efficient implementations, or require user-provided hard-coded pre-conditions that are time consuming and highly non-trivial, even for an expert. In this article, we tackle the compositional verification problem of first-order masking countermeasures, where first-order means that the adversary is allowed to access only one intermediate computation result. Following the literature, we consider countermeasures given as gadgets, which are special procedures whose inputs are masking encodings of variables. We introduce a new security notion parameterized by an explicit pre-condition for each gadget, as well as composition rules for reasoning about masking countermeasures against power side-channel attacks. We propose accompanying efficient algorithms to automatically infer proper pre-conditions, based on which our new compositional approach can efficiently and automatically prove security for masked implementations. We implement our approaches as a tool MaskCV and conduct experiments on publicly available masked cryptographic implementations including 10 different full AES implementations. The experimental results confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
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More From: ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
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