Composite Procedures and Judicial Review in the Single Resolution Mechanism: Iccrea Banca

Abstract

Iccrea Banca is a landmark ruling regarding judicial protection in composite decision-making procedures. Its importance extends not only to the Banking Union but also to EU administrative law more broadly. This paper argues that the Court's judgment in Iccrea Banca affirms the recent Berlusconi and Fininvest ruling regarding the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and extends its ratio decidendi to the Single Resolution Mechanism. It further argues that Iccrea Banca leaves open a number of questions, notably as regards the irregularities affecting the national preparatory act or proposal that would be reviewed by the CJEU, and the 'legal fate' of that national measure. Furthermore, we do not know which other composite procedures, whether within or beyond the Banking Union, would come to be decided under the principles established in this case. It is likely that more litigation will follow on these matters, and that future case law will provide much-needed answers to the questions left open in Iccrea Banca and earlier rulings.