Abstract
We suggest two new notions of game equilibrium for arbitrary conflict problems (antagonistic, noncooperative, cooperative, static, and dynamic ones), which permit one to find a unique strongest equilibrium in some cases in which it is impossible to find such a solution with the use of all earlier known notions of equilibrium.
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