Compliance with Its WTO Commitments: China's Intention, Capacity and Policy

Abstract

This paper uses the compliance theory to examine the China's WTO Accession Agreement, China's intention to comply and its capacity to comply, its WTO commitments. It concluded as follows: First, China will bear the nearly whole burden of implementing the China's WTO Accession Agreement under the pressure of the WTO and its major members by the enforcement and review mechanisms. Second, China has a comparatively strong intention to comply with the China's WTO Accession Agreement, but the intention needs to be further strengthened; China also has a less weak capacity to comply with the China's WTO Accession Agreement, but the capacity needs to be much further enhanced by capacity-building programs. Chinese legal culture also needs to be thoroughly updated and transformed. Last, China must start to convince the WTO and its current members that China is a good team player and a powerful defender of the WTO rules by its actions rather than its slogans. China's record of compliance with its WTO commitments is mixed so far since China became a member of the WTO. In fact, process of compliance with China's WTO commitments is a part of process of reforming Chinese economy. This is a long and uneven process. China's WTO entry is a unique ”joint venture” enterprise between China, the WTO and its current members, the WTO and its current members (major members in particular) should bear their own shares in implementing the Chinese membership agreement and should fulfill their respective obligations in good faith.