Compliance vs. constraints: A theory of rebel targeting in civil war

Abstract

This article offers a theory of rebel targeting in civil war. Rebels face two logics of targeting: the logic of compliance in areas where they are fighting for territory, and the logic of legitimacy in areas where they remain clandestine. The first boosts civilian targeting because rebels use it as a way to discipline local populations. The second moderates it because unqualified civilian killings could prompt rebels’ supporters to turn against the group and easily help bring down its clandestine structures. In order to avoid this backlash, rebels focus on attacking ‘legitimate’ targets such as security forces and authorities. This supporters’ constraint is mitigated when the state heavily represses the rebels’ constituency – which increases supporters’ appetite for indiscriminate retaliation – and when the rebels can rely on independent funding – which reduces rebels’ dependence on supporters’ help. I test the argument with detailed information about rebel presence and political violence in Peru from 1980 to 1995. The results support that civilian victimization is driven by rebel strength, since the more control the rebels hold, the more civilians are targeted. Thus, when Shining Path was forced to operate clandestinely on a permanent basis, it carried out more actions against hard targets, so as to remain a legitimate force within its urban support base.