Compliance negotiations in EU external relations: the case of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement

Abstract

ABSTRACT The article advances the research on compliance negotiations in the context of the EU’s external relations. It develops further the framework on EU compliance negotiations, introduced by Jönsson and Tallberg in 1998, and provides empirical evidence from a case study on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’s implementation. The article suggests three arguments for the expansion of the original framework. Firstly, we add to the framework the case of pre-emptive compliance negotiations, i.e. negotiations in view of anticipated non-compliance. Secondly, it is suggested to supplement the original framework with the ‘object of negotiations’ category, as the issue at stake influences other variables in compliance negotiations, such as the power relations between the parties and the conflictive vs. cooperative nature of the negotiations. Thirdly, the article unpacks the role of multistakeholder networks in the dynamics of compliance negotiations in the EU’s external relations.