Compliance, corruption and co-management: how corruption fuels illegalities and undermines the legitimacy of fisheries co-management

Fiona Nunan,Ernest Yongo,Bwambale Mbilingi,Dražen Cepić,Paul Onyango,Elizabeth Mlahagwa,Konstantine Odongkara,Mwanahamis Salehe,Monica Owili

doi:10.18352/ijc.827

Abstract

Links between corruption and illegal practices within fisheries are recognised in existing literature but little reference has been made to how these interconnected practices affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries co-management. Research in the three countries bordering Lake Victoria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, demonstrated that corruption is systemic and that members of all stakeholder groups – fishers, fisheries officers, police and the judiciary - are implicated. It was confirmed that corruption is strongly linked to illegalities and that corruption in this context should be viewed as a collection action problem, with fishers reluctant to invest in legal gears and methods when they perceive illegalities and corruption to be prevalent. It was also found that corrupt practices linked to illegalities discourages local level fisheries management structures – the Beach Management Units – from enforcing regulations and contributes to a lack of trust between fishers and government. Linked corruption and illegal fisheries practices were therefore found to be undermining the performance and legitimacy of co-management. The article concludes that whilst co-management offers opportunities for collusive corruption through collaborative arrangements, any management system will be susceptible to the harmful effects of corruption where it is systemic and is not formally recognised or appropriately addressed. Greater official recognition of the links between corruption and illegalities, and a range of appropriate actions taken to this collective action problem, is essential if co-management is to have a chance of success.

Highlights

The adoption of a co-management approach in fisheries often stems from a desire to improve compliance with regulations, driven in part by a belief that bringing resource users into management will incentivise compliance (Jentoft 2000; Evans et al 2011; Cinner and Huchery 2014)
This paper examines how governance systems, in particular co-management, may be affected by corruption linked to illegal practices and seeks to answer the following overarching question: how does corruption linked to fisheries illegalities affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries co-management?
Who is alleged to be involved in corrupt practices; why and how do corrupt practices take place? Fisheries management on Lake Victoria involves a wide range of actors

Summary

Introduction

The adoption of a co-management approach in fisheries often stems from a desire to improve compliance with regulations, driven in part by a belief that bringing resource users into management will incentivise compliance (Jentoft 2000; Evans et al 2011; Cinner and Huchery 2014). The ability of co-management to deliver on improved compliance has not been unequivocally demonstrated (Cinner and Huchery 2014). Efforts to understand why this is may draw on research into the prevalence of illegalities, which has focused on the motivations of fishers to comply or not comply, identifying a range of economic and social/moral motivations (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Raakjær Nielsen 2003; Gezelius and Hauck 2011). Corruption, through the payment of bribes to avoid sanctions and to enable illegal practices to continue, has been shown to be a factor in weak enforcement and non-compliance (Gezelius and Hauck 2011; Sundström 2016). Though, there is limited evidence available on how corruption associated with fishing illegalities affects governance systems

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Discussion

Conclusion