Abstract
In this paper, a decision-making competition game model concerning governments, agricultural enterprises, and the public, all of which participate in the reduction of nitrogen emissions in the watersheds, is established based on bounded rationality. First, the stability conditions of the equilibrium points in the system are discussed, and the stable region of the Nash equilibrium is determined. Then, the bifurcation diagram, maximal Lyapunov exponent, strange attractor, and sensitive dependence on the initial conditions are shown through numerical simulations. The research shows that the adjustment speed of three players’ decisions may alter the stability of the Nash equilibrium point and lead to chaos in the system. Among these decisions, a government’s decision has the largest effect on the system. In addition, we find that some parameters will affect the stability of the system; when the parameters become beneficial for enterprises to reduce nitrogen emissions, the increase in the parameters can help control the chaotic market. Finally, the delay feedback control method is used to successfully control the chaos in the system and stabilize it at the Nash equilibrium point. The research of this paper is of great significance to the environmental governance decisions and nitrogen reduction management.
Highlights
According to the European Nitrogen Assessment, the total economic loss caused by the reactive nitrogen in 27 countries of the European Union amount to 70–320 billion euros per year. e economic cost of the reactive nitrogen pollution is about twice that of Europe’s “willingness” to pay for carbon controls
In order to further explore the chaotic phenomenon caused by a change in the decision-making adjustment speed, we investigated the sensitivity at the initial value of the system (6). ese numerical simulations are performed by setting α1 1.28, α2 0.21, and α3 0.5
In this paper, bounded rationality, nitrogen emission trading, and the subsidy of reductions in nitrogen emissions are considered in terms of a dynamic game involving the government, enterprises, and the public, and a decisionmaking game model is established based on bounded rationality
Summary
According to the European Nitrogen Assessment, the total economic loss caused by the reactive nitrogen in 27 countries of the European Union amount to 70–320 billion euros per year. e economic cost of the reactive nitrogen pollution is about twice that of Europe’s “willingness” to pay for carbon controls. Erefore, as the main players in the reduction of nitrogen emissions in the river basin, any party in government and agricultural enterprises and the social public decisions will be influenced by the other two parties. Most scholars mainly focused on the decisionmaking game of emission reduction, price, or output of enterprises, whereas seldom discussed the decisions of government policies and the public. When the government and the public are involved in nitrogen emission reduction work, under a series of environmental policies and public supervision, studying the complex dynamic behavior of a game involving governments, agricultural enterprises, and the public with bounded rationality will have great practical significance. Considering nitrogen emission trading, nitrogen emission reduction subsidies, and marginal emission reduction costs, this paper analyzes whether governments, agricultural enterprises, and the public make an optimal decision according to their own decision rules in the game.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
