Abstract
The present paper investigates rational interactions in a large government network when its government members coordinate to make economic decisions. We show that the complexity of such massive interactions could be simplified by hierarchically decomposing the original complex game as a collection of much simpler games. Besides, the political structure of a government network is formally introduced, and some of its characterizations are proven or demonstrated to be efficient indicators of the relevant game structure. We then propose a pragmatic solution concept for the complex game through a quasi-dynamic integration process.
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