Year-end Sale % OFF 
Abstract
Standard semantic theories predict that non-deictic readings for complex demonstratives should be much more widely available than they in fact are. If such readings are the result of a lexical ambiguity, as Kaplan (in: Almog, Perry, Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) and others suggest, we should expect them to be available wherever a definite description can be used. The same prediction follows from ‘hidden argument’ theories like the ones described by King (Complex Demonstratives: a Quantificational Account, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001) and Elbourne (Situations and Individuals, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005). Wolter (That’s That; the Semantics and Pragmatics of Demonstrative Noun Phrases. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Santa Cruz, 2006), however, has shown that complex demonstratives admit non-deictic interpretations only when a precise set of structural constrains are met. In this paper, I argue that Wolter’s results, properly understood, upend the philosophical status quo. They fatally undermine the ambiguity theory and demand a fundamental rethinking of the hidden argument approach.
Highlights
Philosophers’ interest in complex demonstratives has traditionally been focused on deictic instances; i.e., instances on which a demonstrative is used to pick out an object from the context of utterance, as in:(1) That river looks treacherous.Synthese (2021) 198:2865–2900Most philosophical work on the topic has revolved around the question of how to represent the semantic contribution of the pointing gesture, as well as the question of how to represent the contribution of the predicate from which the complex demonstrative is formed.1As King (2001) made clear, it is a striking fact about complex demonstratives that not all uses conform to the familiar deictic paradigm
On that alternative configuration, which is generally attributed to Bach and Cooper (1978), instead of the noun and the relative clause combining to form a constituent that picks out a single property as in (8), the determiner takes the noun as one argument and the relative clause as another, as in (9): (8)
Since the differences in the two Mandarin structures are marked explicitly, they provide a direct source of evidence for the kind of semantic theory advanced here
Summary
Philosophers’ interest in complex demonstratives has traditionally been focused on deictic instances; i.e., instances on which a demonstrative is used to pick out an object from the context of utterance, as in:. Kaplan (1977), Davies (1982), Neale (1993), Dever (2001), Salmon (2002, 2006, 2008), Corrazza (2003), Comorovski (2007), Braun (2008), and Georgi (2012), on the other hand, maintain that directly referential semantic theories should only be required to explain deictic data Those philosophers who take non-deictic data seriously typically offer theories that treat complex demonstratives as a special kind of definite description. On the hidden argument theory, the lexicon is simple, in that it features just one instance of the determiner ‘that’, but the semantics for that item is more complicated Both views make the same empirical prediction: that complex demonstratives should always admit of a description-type reading. (7) The author of Waverley wrote Ivanhoe Both the ambiguity treatment of ‘that’ and the hidden argument approach predict that non-deictic interpretations should be available for demonstratives wherever a definite description is. That is, that at least some relative clauses occur in a syntactic and semantic configuration different from the one most theorists expect. On that alternative configuration, which is generally attributed to Bach and Cooper (1978), instead of the noun and the relative clause combining to form a constituent that picks out a single property as in (8), the determiner takes the noun as one argument and the relative clause as another, as in (9):
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
