Abstract

We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that exhibit complete rent dissipation. If the prize values are observable by the contest designer, for any value tuple, we show that there exists a CSF that exhibits complete dissipation in any equilibrium if and only if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to three or the values are homogeneous. If the values are unobservable by the contest designer, we show that there exists no CSF that exhibits complete dissipation in some equilibrium for any value tuple.

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