Competitive Spectrum Sharing and Pricing in Cognitive Wireless Mesh Networks

Abstract

In a cognitive wireless network, the licensed users (i.e., primary users) can sell redundant spectrum to unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users) or secondary service providers. We consider a scenario where routers in the secondary users' network form a wireless infrastructure mesh network, which is overlaid on networks of several primary service providers, to relay the secondary users' traffic through multiple hops to the destination. For such a cognitive wireless mesh network, we investigate two levels of competitions. The first level of competition is among the primary users (or primary service providers) to choose the price for spectrum opportunities to maximize their revenues. The second level of competition is among the secondary users for spectrum usage to choose the source rate to maximize their utilities. Assuming that both primary and secondary users are selfish and they both wish to optimize their self-interest, we show how to use noncooperative games to formulate each of these competitions. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution for both competitions. Performance evaluation of the proposed spectrum sharing and pricing framework for cognitive wireless mesh networks is carried out which shows several interesting aspects of the problem.