Abstract
Sharing of radio spectrum between different types of wireless systems (e.g., different service providers) is the foundation for making more efficient usage of spectrum. Cognitive radio technologies have spurred the design of spectrum servers that coordinate the sharing of spectrum between different wireless systems. These servers receive information regarding the needs of each system, and then provide instructions back to each system regarding the spectrum bands they may use. This sharing of information is complicated by the fact that these systems are often in competition with each other: each system desires to use as much of the spectrum as possible to support its users, and each system could learn and harm the bands of the other system. Three problems arise in such a spectrum-sharing problem: (1) how to maintain reliable performance for each system-shared resource (licensed spectrum); (2) whether to believe the resource requests announced by each agent; and (3) if they do not believe, how much effort should be devoted to inspecting spectrum so as to prevent possible malicious activity. Since this problem can arise for a variety of wireless systems, we present an abstract formulation in which the agents or spectrum server introduces obfuscation in the resource assignment to maintain reliability. We derive a closed form expression for the expected damage that can arise from possible malicious activity, and using this formula we find a tradeoff between the amount of extra decoys that must be used in order to support higher communication fidelity against potential interference, and the cost of maintaining this reliability. Then, we examine a scenario where a smart adversary may also use obfuscation itself, and formulate the scenario as a signaling game, which can be solved by applying a classical iterative forward-induction algorithm. For an important particular case, the game is solved in a closed form, which gives conditions for deciding whether an agent can be trusted, or whether its request should be inspected and how intensely it should be inspected.
Highlights
Cognitive radio (CR) networks are being explored as a powerful tool to improve spectrum efficiency by allowing unlicensed users (SUs) to use spectrum belonging to a licensed user (PU) as long as they do not cause interference
Problems related to spectrum scanning have been presented in [31,32], where the objective is to develop spectrum-scanning strategies that support the detection of a user illicitly using spectrum, and [33] for detecting attacks aimed at reducing the size of spectrum opportunities in a dynamic spectrum-sharing problem. [34] studied the interactions between a user and a smart jammer regarding their respective choices of transmit power in a general wireless setting, while [35,36] considered problems related to game theory and network security, While these references are not directly relevant to the spectrum allocation problem explored in this paper, these references help motivate the work that we present in this paper
We have presented a new game-theoretic framework that can be useful in designing a dynamic spectrum access channel management protocol when there is the potential of an untrustworthy secondary participant
Summary
Cognitive radio (CR) networks are being explored as a powerful tool to improve spectrum efficiency by allowing unlicensed (secondary) users (SUs) to use spectrum belonging to a licensed (primary) user (PU) as long as they do not cause interference. The current work goes beyond the interference tradeoffs explored in [22], to include in the game the potential for each agent to believe/dis-believe the information being shared, and to give the primary user the ability to inspect the spectrum activities of a secondary user. [34] studied the interactions between a user and a smart jammer regarding their respective choices of transmit power in a general wireless setting, while [35,36] considered problems related to game theory and network security, While these references are not directly relevant to the spectrum allocation problem explored in this paper, these references help motivate the work that we present in this paper.
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