Abstract
This paper studies a game-theoretic model of traffic flow assignment with multiple customer groups and the BPR delay function on a parallel channel network. We prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in the game of m ? 2 traffic navigation providers and derive explicit expressions for equilibrium strategies. And finally, we show that the competition of navigation providers on the network increases the average travel time between origin and destination areas.
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