Abstract

We study a multi-period oligopolistic market for a single perishable product with fixed inventory. Our goal is to address the competitive aspect of the problem together with demand uncertainty using ideas from robust optimization and variational inequalities. The demand function for each seller has some associated uncertainty and we assume that the sellers would like to adopt a policy that is robust to adverse uncertain circumstances. We believe this is the first paper that uses robust optimization for dynamic pricing under competition. In particular, starting with a given fixed inventory, each seller competes over a multi-period time horizon in the market by setting prices and protection levels for each period at the beginning of the time horizon. Any unsold inventory at the end of the horizon is worthless. The sellers do not have the option of periodically reviewing and replenishing their inventory. We study non-cooperative Nash equilibrium policies for sellers under such a model. This kind of a setup can be used to model pricing of air fares, hotel reservations, bandwidth in communication networks, etc. In this paper we demonstrate our results through some numerical examples.

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