Abstract
Abstract This article analyses the current regulatory framework governing transnational restrictive business practices. It identifies key gaps that provide room for anticompetitive practices to flourish, causing cross-border transfer of wealth, typically from less affluent states. The economic harm caused by cross-border anticompetitive conduct is significant; international cartels alone caused overcharges exceeding $1.5 trillion in the period 1990–2016. This article offers a series of pragmatic policy recommendations that could narrow existing regulatory gaps. The proposals require no international negotiations and can be implemented domestically. They call for enabling of more assertive and robust extraterritorial enforcement of domestic competition laws and facilitation of positive externalities in that context.
Highlights
Progressing the integration of national economies into a global system has delivered a variety of benefits in recent decades, especially faster economic growth
This article shows that the current regime de facto works for the select few, principally developed states, but offers little recourse to other countries affected by transnational violations of competition law
Canada is the world’s leading producer of potash, over 95 per cent of which is sold via an export cartel on foreign markets
Summary
Progressing the integration of national economies into a global system has delivered a variety of benefits in recent decades, especially faster economic growth. This article shows that the current regime de facto works for the select few, principally developed states, but offers little recourse to other countries affected by transnational violations of competition law. In doing so, it identifies the issue of wealth transfer, which should inform any approaches to rectifying violations.[13]. The proposals are underpinned by pragmatism, calling for incremental changes and fine-tuning within the existing regulatory framework, rather than a major overhaul They focus exclusively on pursuing international cartels, which constitute the most rampant example of anticompetitive conduct and which are virtually universally condemned. If implemented by a sufficient number of states (a bottom-up regulatory change), these proposals would importantly readjust the currently sub-optimal system of enforcement, which gives violators ample opportunities to extract wealth from less affluent states
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