Competitive Evaluation of Malaysia Enhanced Profitability Terms with Southeast Asia Fiscal Terms

Abstract

Abstract Malaysia has introduced a shallow-water enhanced profitability term (EPT) production sharing contract (PSC) in the year 2021 to reward a PSC contractor with equitable returns reflecting the business risk and the opportunity to accelerate development and monetization. This study evaluates the attractiveness of the EPT against several fiscal terms adopted in southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar. This paper established an offshore shallow-water field development analogue project with a total production volume of 68 MMbbl, capital expenditure (Capex) of USD 530 million, predevelopment operating expenditure (Opex) of USD 36 million, variable Opex of USD 12.5/bbl, floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) rental of USD 61 million/year, and abandonment capital of USD 101 million. High, base, and low scenarios are considered for oil price per barrel as USD 70, 60, and 50, respectively, and production volume scenarios as 78, 68, and 58 MMbbl, respectively. These values with certain fiscal assumptions are input into a fiscal model engine for economic indicators [net present value (NPV), rate of return (ROR), and payback], revenue take, after-tax cashflow, and variables sensitivity calculations to evaluate base, optimistic, and pessimistic cases. In the base case, the attractiveness order of countries based on a higher-positive NPV at 10% and ROR are Malaysia EPT (NPV at 10% = USD 198 million, ROR = 30.4%), Indonesia PSC (2017) (NPV at 10% = USD 149 million, ROR = 28.3%), and Thailand Royalty and Tax (R/T; 1991) (NPV at 10% = USD 32 million, ROR = 14.5%). In the optimistic case, the NPVs at 10% are improved, ranging from Thailand (+271%), Myanmar (+247%), Malaysia (+151%), and Indonesia and Vietnam (+141%) as compared to the base case. In the pessimistic case, all the fiscal terms are unfeasible for ROR at 10%. Myanmar PSC (1993) yields above 10% ROR only when the production is at the base or high scenario with oil price at USD 70/bbl. Vietnam PSC (2013) is unfeasible for positive NPV at 10% even with high oil price under various taxes, including the windfall profit tax. Indonesia has a better NPV at 10% at a low oil price because of the progressive split that subsidizes the operator. Oil price and production volume are the top two sensitive variables except for Vietnam, where capital is the highest. The contractor take is higher in Malaysia, followed by Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam at base and high oil price. When the oil price is low, Indonesia generated a higher contractor take than Malaysia. Malaysia EPT is the only fiscal regime that can generate a contractor take that is higher than government take and stagnant around 55% against the 40% in Indonesia. In conclusion, Malaysia EPT provides a better investment return when the oil price is USD 60/bbl and above, while Indonesia gross split is more profitable when the oil price is low. This study provides insights on the potential investment returns by new EPT fiscal terms. The attractiveness and potential margin upside when the oil price is on the rebound paves the way for other southeast Asia fiscal terms.