Abstract

This article analyses the effect of different entry regulations on company conduct and traveller behaviour. The paper presents a comprehensive case study of three railway markets with significantly different entry policies using data on prices and frequencies together with a survey conducted to obtain revealed preferences. The study employs data from the three main lines in the Czech Republic. The two open access markets tended to provide significantly higher connection frequencies than the line with regulated entry did. Surprisingly, low price variation across the rail and bus markets suggests low monopoly power for the monopolised incumbent and its uniform price strategy across markets with different entry regulations. On the other hand, high price sensitivity among travellers confirms the importance of intramodal competition.

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