Abstract
In this paper, we focus on the blood services industry in the US, which is undergoing major changes, including a rise in competition, and we develop a novel game theory model for blood donations among blood service organizations in which the organizations seek to maximize their transaction utilities and compete on the quality of service that they provide at the blood collection sites in different regions. The governing equilibrium concept is that of Nash Equilibrium. We formulate the equilibrium as a variational inequality problem and prove the existence of the equilibrium quality level service pattern. We also provide conditions for uniqueness and present a Lagrange analysis and interpretation associated with the lower and upper bounds on the quality service levels. An algorithm with nice features for computations is proposed and then applied to numerical examples of increasing complexity. The results demonstrate that enhanced competition can improve the quality service level and that blood service organizations can also benefit from having collection sites in multiple regions.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
