Abstract
Abstract This work presents the first analysis of competition through horizontal and vertical differentiation in option demand markets, which are common in the health-care sector. I studied two alternative market structures: (a) a “pure” option demand market where medical providers sell insurance directly to consumers and (b) a public insurance regime where the public insurer bargains over prices with providers before bundling both products under a single insurance policy. I show that (a) product choices in option demand markets differ greatly from those in respective spot markets and (b) bundling medical products under a single insurance policy alters product choices and equilibrium prices in a way that does not benefit consumers.
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