Abstract
We replicate the “Multiple-partners game” of Sotomayor (1992) to yield a sequence with infinitely many terms. Each term, with more than one stage, is endowed with a structure of subgames given by the previous terms. The concepts of sequential stability and of perfect competitive equilibrium are introduced and characterized. We show that there is a subsequence, such that, for all its terms, these concepts, as well as the traditional concepts of stability and of competitive equilibrium, lead to the same set of allocations, which may be distinct of the core. This not always hold for the terms out of that subsequence.
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