Compensation incentives, geographical distance, and the successful exit of indirect CVCs

Abstract

PurposeThe literature suggests that increasing the intensity of compensation incentives for corporate venture capital (CVC) managers can contribute to successful exits of direct CVCs. This study explores the impact of compensation incentives on the successful exits of indirect CVCs under different geographical distances between parent companies and indirect CVC managers.Design/methodology/approachThe authors observed the compensation terms of CVC managers through investment announcements made by listed companies and used a probit regression model to test the hypotheses from a sample of 241 investment events with indirect CVCs in China.FindingsThe results show that if parent companies are geographically close to the managers of indirect CVCs, increasing the intensity of compensation incentives for managers will help the successful exit of indirect CVCs. However, if parent companies are not geographically close to indirect CVC managers, increasing the intensity of compensation incentives for managers will not promote the successful exit of indirect CVCs.Originality/valueThis study contributes significantly to the CVC literature. First, it sharpens our understanding of the differences in operational mechanisms between direct and indirect CVCs. Second, we find that the threshold returns of indirect CVC managers are non-negligible compensation incentives. Finally, the empirical evidence supports that in indirect CVC investments, the geographical distance between parent companies and managers is concerning because it affects whether compensation incentives contribute to the successful exit of indirect CVCs.