Compellence and batna for the Denuclearization of North Korea

Abstract

Abstract This article analyzes the denuclearization negotiations with North Korea and recommends options to compel North Korea to denuclearize, focusing on the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (batna) concept. President Trump’s recent denuclearization summit meetings with North Korea failed because he did not employ a batna in his negotiations. A few candidates for the batna are compared and evaluated using criteria of effectiveness and feasibility. This article concludes that military strikes or economic sanctions cannot be relevant as batna s because of North Korea’s success in developing its second-strike nuclear capabilities and probable Chinese support. While South Korea’s nuclear armament does not seem feasible in the short term, another nuclear-sharing arrangement in Northeast or East Asia could be a viable and practical batna. The United States and South Korea should implement this batna gradually, reflecting the degree of the nuclear threat from North Korea.