Abstract
This paper compares import tariffs and import price caps as policy measures to regulate a foreign monopolist. We show that for any positive import tariff there exists a set of price caps each of which Pareto-dominates the tariff. This result is particularly important in the case of nontransferable utilities, as in the illustrated example of the EU-Russia gas market.
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