Comparison of North and South Korean early childhood education

Last orders in Pyongyang

The mobile phone applications currently adopts and increasingly applies in education. The applications are widely used to promote and support learning in many levels and contexts. In this research, the 19 sophomore students who enrolled in a school curriculum in early childhood education course at Suan Dusit University in Thailand were expected to have the ability to design the school curriculum in early childhood education according to the early childhood school curriculum compositions with Roomle 3D & AR room planner application after using the learning approach of community-based integration and the use of application. The Roomle 3D & AR room planner application was used as a tool to draw floor plans, furnish and decorate the early childhood classroom and school. This study also aims to compare the academic achievement and to study the students’ learning satisfaction in the school curriculum in early childhood education course before and after using the learning approach of community-based integration and the use of application. The statistics used in this research were mean, standard deviation and percentage. The results showed the students’ ability to design the school curriculum in early childhood education according to the early childhood school curriculum compositions with Roomle 3D & AR room planner application. After using the learning approach, the students had an average score of 14.89 and a standard deviation of 2.08 which is 74.47% higher than before. The students’ learning satisfaction was also at the highest level with the mean of 4.77 and the standard deviation of 0.40. Thus, it can be concluded that the community-based integration and the use of application can be used in promoting student's learning and increasing their knowledge towards the subject learning.

Curriculum material is generally considered the subject matter of information, talents, dispositions, understandings, and principles that make up research programs in the field. At a more complex level, the curricula need to contain historical and socio-political strengths, traditions, cultural views, and goals with wide differences in sovereignty, adaptation, and local understanding that encompass a diversity of cultures, laws, metaphysics, and political discourse This study aims to develop a curriculum with local content as a new approach in early childhood science learning. The Local Content Curriculum (LCC) is compiled and developed to preserve the uniqueness of local culture, natural environment, and community crafts for early childhood teachers so that they can introduce local content to early childhood. Research and model development combines the design of the Dick-Carey and Dabbagh models with qualitative and quantitative descriptive analysis. The results showed that local content curriculum products can be supplemented into early childhood curricula in institutions according to local conditions. Curricula with local content can be used as a reinforcement for the introduction of science in early childhood. The research implication demands the concern of all stakeholders to see that the introduction of local content is very important to be given from an early age, so that children know, get used to, like, maintain, and love local wealth from an early age.
 Keywords: Early Childhood, Scientific Learning, Local Content Curriculum Model

Preface I. Introduction 1. "Silent Voices of Knowing" in the History of Early Childhood Education and Curriculum, Debora Basler Wisneski 2. Curriculum and Research: What Are the Gaps We Ought to Mind? Nancy File II. Influences on Curriculum 3. The Relationship between Child Development and Early Childhood Curriculum, Nancy File 4. From Theory to Curriculum: Developmental Theory and Its Relationship to Curriculum and Instruction in Early Childhood Education, J. Amos Hatch 5. The Curriculum Theory Lens on Early Childhood: Moving Thought into Action, Jennifer J. Mueller 6. From Theory to Curriculum: The Project Approach, Judy Harris Helm 7. Using Critical Theory to Trouble the Early Childhood Curriculum: Is It Enough? Mindy Blaise and Sharon Ryan 8. Using Critical Theories in the Curriculum, Betsy J. Cahill and Tammy L. Gibson III. Examining Curriculum Approaches and Their Applications 9. Infant Toddler Curriculum: Review, Reflection, and Revolution, Diane M. Horm, Carla B. Goble, and Kathryn R. Branscomb 10. Creative Curriculum and High Scope Curriculum: Constructing Possibilities in Early Education, Sara Michael-Luna and Lucinda G. Heimer 11. Te Whariki - The Early Childhood Curriculum of Aotearoa New Zealand, Jenny R. Ritchie and Cary A. Buzzelli 12. A Situated Framework: The Reggio Experience, Andrew J. Stremmel 13. Publishers in the Mix: Examining Literacy Curricula, Mariana Souto-Manning IV. Conclusion 14. The Place of Play in Early Childhood Curriculum, Debora Basler Wisneski and Stuart Reifel 15. Early Childhood Curriculum as Palimpsest, Katherine Delaney and Elizabeth Graue 16. Strengthening Curriculum in Early Childhood, Nancy File, Debora Basler Wisneski, and Jennifer J. Mueller List of Contributors

통일 후 남북한 산업구조 재편 및 북한 성장산업 육성방안 (Ways to Reform Industrial Structure of North and South Korea and Nurture Growth Industries in North Korea after Unification)

본 연구는 남한의 2015 개정 음악과 교육과정과 북한의 2013 개정 음악과 교육과정을 비교 분석하여 통일을 대비하여 남북한 음악과 교육과정 통합을 위해 해결해야 할 시사점을 도출함을 목적으로 한다. 남북한 음악과 교육과정 구성, 문서 체제, 항목별 내용(성격, 목표, 내용, 교수․학습 방향, 평가 방향, 교과서 집필 방향)을 비교한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 음악과의 정의와 역할의 진술 내용, 표현과 감상 영역을 주요한 내용 영역으로 설정하고 있는 점은 남북한 음악과 교육과정의 공통점이라고 할 수 있다. 이는 교육과정을 구성하는 기본적인 항목에서 공통점을 가지고 있는 것이기 때문에 지속시켜 나갈 필요가 있다. 둘째, 북한 음악과 교육과정의 ‘음악무용’ 과목 제시, 애국주의와 사상의 강조, 성취기준의 구체적 제시, 교과서 집필 방향의 상세한 제시 등은 남한 교육과정과의 차이점이다. 교육과정과 교과서의 역할에 대한 시각 차이와 사상적 측면은 앞으로 좁혀나가야 할 중요한 쟁점이다. 이러한 남북한 음악과 교육과정에서의 차이를 줄여 나가기 위해서는 총론과 연계한 남북한 음악과 교육과정 연구, 남북한 음악 용어 차이 극복을 위한 기초 연구, 남북한 공통 음악과 교육과정의 개발 및 적합성 검토가 후속 연구로 수행되어야 한다.This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the revised music curriculum of North and South and draw implications associated with curriculum integration between the two countries. This study set out to compare North and South Korean music curriculums in organization, document system, and content by the item(character, goal, content, teaching and learning direction, evaluation direction, and writing direction for textbooks). The comparison results were as follows: First, both the North and South Korean music curriculums set the definitions and roles of the music subject and its expression and appreciation domains as major areas, which suggests that both of them need to continue these basic items since they are common between their curriculums. Secondly, the North Korean music curriculum was different from its South Korean counterpart in offering the Music and Dance”subject, putting an emphasis on patriotism and ideology, providing specific achievement criteria, and setting directions for textbook writing in details. North and South Korea need to narrow a gap in important issues such as different views of roles of curriculums and textbooks and ideological aspects. These differences between North and South Korean music curriculums can be resolved by doing research on North and South Korean music curriculums associated with the general introduction, basic research to overcome differences in musical terms between North and South Korea, and follow-up research on the development of common music curriculums between North and South Korea and the review of their fitness.

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

Preface I. Introduction 1. Silent Voices of Knowing in the History of Early Childhood Education and Curriculum, Debora Basler Wisneski 2. Curriculum and Research: What Are the Gaps We Ought to Mind? Nancy File II. Influences on Curriculum 3. The Relationship between Child Development and Early Childhood Curriculum, Nancy File 4. From Theory to Curriculum: Developmental Theory and Its Relationship to Curriculum and Instruction in Early Childhood Education, J. Amos Hatch 5. The Curriculum Theory Lens on Early Childhood: Moving Thought into Action, Jennifer J. Mueller 6. From Theory to Curriculum: The Project Approach, Judy Harris Helm 7. Using Critical Theory to Trouble the Early Childhood Curriculum: Is It Enough? Mindy Blaise and Sharon Ryan 8. Using Critical Theories in the Curriculum, Betsy J. Cahill and Tammy L. Gibson III. Examining Curriculum Approaches and Their Applications 9. Infant Toddler Curriculum: Review, Reflection, and Revolution, Diane M. Horm, Carla B. Goble, and Kathryn R. Branscomb 10. Creative Curriculum and High Scope Curriculum: Constructing Possibilities in Early Education, Sara Michael-Luna and Lucinda G. Heimer 11. Te Whariki - The Early Childhood Curriculum of Aotearoa New Zealand, Jenny R. Ritchie and Cary A. Buzzelli 12. A Situated Framework: The Reggio Experience, Andrew J. Stremmel 13. Publishers in the Mix: Examining Literacy Curricula, Mariana Souto-Manning IV. Conclusion 14. The Place of Play in Early Childhood Curriculum, Debora Basler Wisneski and Stuart Reifel 15. Early Childhood Curriculum as Palimpsest, Katherine Delaney and Elizabeth Graue 16. Strengthening Curriculum in Early Childhood, Nancy File, Debora Basler Wisneski, and Jennifer J. Mueller List of Contributors

This study aims to explore the factors of personal characteristics and educational experiences in both North and South Korea that influence the academic achievement of North Korean defector university students. To achieve this objective, a survey was conducted with 163 North Korean defector university students who had received public education in North Korea and were currently enrolled in South Korean universities. Frequency analysis and hierarchical multiple regression analysis were utilized to assess the data. The results indicate that factors such as family background—including political and economic status in North Korea—educational background such as school performance and experiences with academic extracurricular activities in North Korea, as well as experiences with private education in South Korea, play significant roles in the academic achievement of these students. Based on these findings, the study discusses the impact of North Korean family environments, the importance of North Korean educational backgrounds, and the role of private education in South Korea, and further proposes academic support measures for these students.

Our main objective is that North Korea and South Korea become politically and economically a united country. Even before the unification occurs, both North Korea and South Korea must reconcile their difference and work to live with each other. 109 years ago, the city people called the second Jerusalem, Pyongyang, experienced a huge revival and therefore the need to restore peace in this place is vital for saving the souls and proclaiming the return of our Lord Jesus Christ. Additionally, Christian Mission seeks a transformation in a person’s life. Therefore, understanding and analysing the key reasons to the North Korean way of thinking and lifestyle is undeniably a must when looking at the Christian Mission perspective. In order to accomplish a nation-wide reconciliation and unification between North and South Korea, a proposal of unification based on the study of North Korean human rights and problem concerning defectors must be overseen. When the Korean Church can approach this matter in truthful and righteous manner, it can act as a very important mediator. The Understanding of peace and strategy by Unification Mission policy is developed by the strategic policies of North Korea Mission concerning the problems and the realities in North Korean human rights and the search for an improvement, North Korean breakaways, illegal trafficking of defector women and orphans, yoduk prison camp, dualism in North and South Korean relations, etc. The problems of North Korean mission concerning the identity of christianity can be seen by the change in lens of diverse missions . The the globalized world is perceived in the lens of capital logic. Poorer countries and its people are becoming evermore poorer and the difference between the financial traits of North Korea and South Korea has caused a problem. In this aspect, christians must seek to help North Korea mission. It is not only a commandment from Jesus Christ, but also an important part of both nations’ survival and freedom which should also be a task for every christians. Therefore, the Korean Church must strive and work for the unification of Korea as a mediator. Only then, can the church truly be a hope to the people of Korea and the values of North Korean mission policies must be created in every christians.

2016년 대북제재 이후 북한경제 변화와 신남북협력 방향 (Changes in the North Korean Economy and Guidelines to New Strategies of Inter-Korean Cooperation after UNSCR since 2016)

Economists have expressed their opinion that the economic trade between countries brings about economic prosperity as well as peace. Their opinion is based upon that the trading countries do not want to face the situation of decline in their welfare and benefits due to not participating in economic trade. They argue that economic trades between countries give them the opportunities of conversation, decrease misunderstanding, and leads them to peaceful mind and behavioral attitude to adjust the political conflicts. On the basis of this kind of opinion and the reunification of Germany, the economic trade between South and North Korea has been suggested as the most efficient measure to maintain the peace in Korean Peninsula. It has been twenty four years since the economic trade between South and North Korea was triggered in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo’s Declaration of July 7 in spite of several crises. The total turnover between South and North Korea is about US$ 18.3 billion from 1989 to 2012, out of which US$ 9.2 billion is the export to the North and US$ 9.1 billion is the import from the North. Since the end of cold war, South Korea and China have established diplomatic relations on July 24, 1992, and they have become strategic cooperative partners. The total turnover between South Korea and China was US$ 6.4 billion in 1992, and it increased to US$ 215.2 billion in 2012. On the other hand, the total turnover between North Korea and China amounts to US$ 5.9 billion in 2012, which is around three times as much as that between South and North Korea. The results of theoretical analyses are summarized as follows. First of all, exports and imports between South and North Korea turned out to ease the conflicts between two countries. Therefore, ‘theory of peace through trade’ by the liberalists was supported here. Secondly, it turned out that the economic trade between North Korea and China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if South Korea and China are in friendly partnership. It implies that China induces North Korea to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. Thirdly, exports from South Korea to China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are friendly partners politically. Imports from China to South. Korea affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are in antagonistic relationship politically. Empirical analysis shows that the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea turned out to have a significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It implies that the increase of the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea is likely to ease the conflicts between two countries. On the other hand, the difference quotient in the imports turned out to have significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It tells that the increase of the imports is likely to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. While the expand of trade with China will ease the conflicts in Korean Peninsula from the theoretical viewpoint, empirical analyses present opposite results. It implies that the relationship between North Korea and China since the end of cold war is not the same as that before the end of cold war. It also tells that North Korea puts the higher political priority to developing the nuclear weapon and long-range missile. Inter-Korean policy has to keep consistency focusing economic cooperation apart from political issues. Long-term goal of inter-Korean policy should be unification, although short-term one is peace and stability in Korean Peninsula.

The image is very familiar to us: a scholar overcoming Cold War barriers to study a land where travel, let alone research, is impossible; their diligence paying off by locating materials that allow them to circumvent the obstacles and the propaganda created by the world’s “most isolated” regime; the resulting research offering a never-before-seen view into the inner truths of this nigh-impenetrable land.Or, at least, so we would have it.This is the image we North Korean researchers have often taken for ourselves.1 Playing off of old colonial images of the “hermit kingdom” now transferred to Pyongyang, our work has tended to capitalize on ideas of North Korea as a scholarly terra incognita, as though it was the last blank space on the map in an otherwise globalized world. This tendency, encouraged by the commercial instincts of publishers, has emphasized the solitary scholar working in a challenging environment while downplaying how this self-representation reinforces many of the shibboleths prominent in the media that our own research ostensibly seeks to dispel.In suggesting that this self-representation is, at best, a tad on the dramatic side and, at worst, self-serving, the seven articles in this special issue make one very simple point: the study of North Korea may not be so difficult after all. Ranging from investigations into science fiction literature to explorations of textual exchanges between the North and South, from the uses of quantitative data to ruminations on possible research agendas for anthropologists, and from treatments of Chinese soldier war memoirs to forays into international politics, this special issue shows that just because we cannot go to North Korea does not mean research is impossible. This special issue demonstrates that what might be called the “North Korean archive” is much broader and deeper than normally assumed. Indeed, arguably more sources exist for North Korea than for many other historical periods, including virtually any era leading up to the Chosŏn dynasty. As much as limits exist to these sources, the authors of this special issue ensure that the days of declaiming, “We can’t get there” or lamenting, “There are no sources” should be behind us.So, too, do they ask a wide array of research questions, based on the methodology of each author’s discipline. In so doing, they expand our understanding of what it is possible to ask when it comes to North Korea and cut through some of the Cold War conceptual categories that have boxed in our research. The result is a more varied and diverse understanding. Brought together as part of a workshop sponsored by the Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University and organized by Professor Gregg Brazinsky and Professor Jisoo Kim, these authors worked together through an online workshop and roundtable to consider the past, current, and future directions of research on North Korea. Everyone present agreed significant shifts were underway. True, there remain questions that cannot be answered, yet there are plenty of materials for new questions with lots of answers. The articles themselves simply get on with the work of doing research, showing that rich research possibilities exist by deploying different sources and asking novel questions.At the heart of this special issue is the question of opening up access, which, however infeasible geopolitically, is certainly possible for scholarship. Degree of access, of course, fluctuates depending on the nationality of the scholar, with many European scholars having more contact with North Korean scholars. Given relations between Seoul and Washington, American scholars have less access than almost all but their South Korean colleagues. Sonia Ryang begins her article with a question directed to colleagues in a field whose research is arguably the most disrupted by North Korea’s barriers to research regardless of their nationality: anthropology. “How could one carry out an anthropological study of North Korea,” she asks, “if one were not able to conduct long-term or even short-term ethnographic fieldwork on the ground?” Ryang’s question is relevant to other disciplines as well. Yet rather than be dissuaded, Ryang moves beyond the question itself, insisting on the possibility of research from a distance. Ryang argues that a text-based approach—“a reading of heterogeneous texts”—can offer a starting point to examine North Korea on its own terms and even, she goes on to argue, be turned back to question anthropological methodology itself.2 In arguing for critical treatment of North Korean texts, Ryang brings her anthropology closer to the methodology of the other social scientists and humanists in the special issue, all of whom confirm that there are, in fact, lots of materials for studying North Korea outside its boundaries.3There is, in short, a more expansive North Korean archive. Two of these types of sources (interviews and the archives of former socialist allies) are more familiar and another (Pyongyang published texts) less so. Each has its own idiosyncratic shortcomings and advantages, but when combined and engaged with critically, this expanded archive offers ways of diversifying possible research subjects and lines of inquiry.It is now an almost hackneyed usage among late twentieth-century scholars to call for an escape from Cold War–era approaches. Yet in the Korean peninsula, where the Cold War has yet to cease, where security problems still dominate the headlines, where in South Korea, National Security Laws still constrain research on North Korea, and where anti-communist rhetoric is still very much alive, the conceptual categories and narrative strategies of the Cold War, however much critiqued in other settings, remain powerful in shaping much writing about North Korea. The contributors represent a growing shift in scholarship that recognizes how studies on North Korea have been shaped by the Cold War at the same time as they have helped maintain the particular peninsular-specific structures of the Cold War—the division system. The significance of diversifying scholarly approaches is not just about North Korea but also about the division system itself.One of the longest-standing modes of research into North Korea has been interviewing people who left the country. From the 1950s to 1980s, these emigrants consisted largely of defectors, whose testimonies were dominated by South Korean intelligence services. With the changes in the Northeast political economy—in particular the rise of the Chinese juggernaut and the interlinked marketization in North Korea—as well as the food insecurity of the early 1990s, the irregular numbers of defectors became a virtual flood of migrants.4 Although defectors formerly consisted mainly of ex-officials and were almost always male, the new emigrants came with more assorted socioeconomic backgrounds. Women were predominant, they held more diverse motivations for leaving, and they originated primarily, though not exclusively, from locations close to the Chinese border.5 That this change in number and origin occurred at the same time as the fall of the Berlin Wall, together with a renewed attention to Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons, ensured that the flow of people out of the North attracted global media attention. A celebrity culture of a sort resulted, with key exiles gaining an international profile through such media as TED Talks. Publishers followed suit, often framing memoirs and biographies as the latest generation of that venerable Cold War genre, escape literature.6 Many NGOs took up the cause, framing the testimony of migrants in the language of liberal human rights—a vocabulary newly acquired and often fitting awkwardly in the speeches of those making tours of university campuses. The formation of the Committee on Human Rights in North Korea led to a flurry of English-language publications on human rights issues.7Academic research soon followed the arrival of North Koreans. Nothing in English rivals the quantity or quality of the long-term, consistent surveys and interviews conducted by various South Korean agencies and NGOs. Yet in English, too, refugee accounts emerged as a dominant mode for investigating not just the lives of North Koreans but also the nature of the regime. For the most part, these works have highlighted human rights issues or have conducted broad surveys framed by the traditional concerns of political science—namely, regime legitimacy and durability.8 Some work has rested exclusively on interviews while others have adopted interdisciplinary approaches, combining interviews with complementary written sources and often moving beyond a human rights or security framework.9 The result has been a mini-industry of interview-based studies, resulting in a boom that in both quantitative and qualitative terms produced much empirical data and analytical insights.These studies have not come without problems, however. Some English-language researchers have been blunt about the perils of interviews, questioning the representativeness of available interviewees who have skewed to the border regions, who, after all, were a self-selected group, and who for whatever personal reasons had left the country.10 In Korea, critiques have arisen concerning the negative side effects of the interview boom.11 Monetary payments to interview subjects who are often living precariously, critics have pointed out, have led some North Koreans to seek out interviews, leading to a cycle of repetition where different researchers often rely on the same subjects. Such repeat interviewees, together with word-of-mouth accounts of their experiences, have led some critics to question whether interviewees respond according to what they perceive to be the needs of researchers. Others have wondered whether stories appealing to human rights–style narratives become privileged in the telling, as interviewees “perform” the status of refugees to the organizations that support them. Such open discussions of methodology have been less thoroughly aired in English, where, as Jay Song points out in her contribution to this special issue, foreign researchers have tended to downplay the effect of their presence or, for many, the effect of the act of translation on the interviewing process.At stake here is how individual interviews are used to make larger claims about North Korean political culture. Lest we forget, for decades the Soviet field faced a similar dilemma. It, too, relied on studies based on information derived from exiles, much in the way we today turn to interviews. Today, scholars are well aware of how the negative assessments of defector testimony received an audience among journalists, intelligence services, and scholars who were primed by Cold War rivalries to see them as evidence testifying to the validity of their own preconceptions of totalitarianism—a type of circular confirmation bias that distorted understanding of the complexities of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras.12 With these challenges in mind, Jay Song’s article calls for more transparency in the interviewing field and for qualitative data derived from migrants to be combined with other types of information, in particular quantitative data now readily available through online databases. Similarly, Sonia Ryang argues for more rigorous and critical methodology while also asking for interviews “faithfully documenting how people live their lives in North Korea without veering into political judgement.”If refugees, exiles, and defectors are a long-standing source of information that have recently been revitalized and offer still greater potential, the same might be said of documents from ex-socialist states. Early studies depended on reports from North Korea’s allies, as did American intelligence services.13 Since the end of the Cold War, the opening of the archives of North Korea’s erstwhile allies has been a boon, especially for studies on political and international history. Reports by diplomats stationed in Pyongyang have been fruitfully used to extend our understanding of the origins of the Korean War, elite politics in the Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim Il Sung’s ascension to power, to name just a few.14 Many of these documents have been conveniently translated into English and Korean from languages as various as Albanian to Romanian in a collaborative project between the Woodrow Wilson Center and Kyungnam University. The former director of this project, James Person, points out in his contribution to the special issue that these translated items consist of only a small fraction of the original declassified documents and fall largely into the diplomatic, political, and military realms. This selection on what to translate reflects the dominant biases of the field and, not unsurprisingly, the security orientation of the agencies funding the translations. There is, in short, much work still to be done in these documents, and as Person shows, when combined with other sources, these archives have the potential to transform some of our foundational conceptions of even seemingly well-worn topics, such as the history of factionalism.Work in these multinational, multilanguage documents has special temptations and dilemmas, however. As many scholars inside and outside the Korean studies community are aware, some research emerging out of these archives has been subject to serious controversy.15 Among the lessons learned is that work in these archives will require scholars to meet demanding linguistic standards that abide no shortcuts and a willingness to collaborate openly and honestly with peers around the world. Wide-ranging discussions have followed, spilling over into such issues as the institutional hierarchies endemic to Korean studies, the hegemony of the English language and the United States on the international stage in a project like Korean studies, the (in)effectiveness of peer review, the stakes of academic publishers in downplaying scholarly transgressions, the ease of e-publishing to erase such transgressions, and the gatekeeping power of mainstream professional institutions such as this journal.In pointing out the possibilities and challenges of this underused assortment of documents, Person raises another dilemma. Until recently the flurry of activity in ex-Soviet sources has been conducted with an eye to extracting information to better examine known yet ill-understood events. Often the results have been more precise knowledge. Yet such searches for more data, however useful, nevertheless tend to use these documents transparently without examining the intellectual and cultural milieus in which the documents were produced. As historians have recently shown, the Soviet Union is best understood as a multinational empire, which ruled by privileging the center over peripheries and establishing hierarchies among the peoples that constituted it.16 Despite Soviet claims to pan-racial solidarity—claims often used in its Cold War rivalry with the United States over human rights and racism—these relations remained mired in chauvinism and structured by racial categories. This dynamic frequently contoured Moscow’s relationship with the Asian reaches of its empire. Other scholarship, especially in reference to East Germany, has shown how race consistently framed “comradely” relations within the socialist world.17 Given we know that deep affinities existed between the domestic, racialized politics of the United States and its diplomatic and cultural policies abroad (an issue that no good history of US-South Korean relations can ignore), it becomes imperative to ask the equivalent question for Soviet and East European politics: How did their racialized and cross-cultural assumptions extend to their treatment of North Korea?18 Or more specifically to our purpose, how did these biases shape the reports of Pyongyang-based diplomats that today are being used by researchers to reconstruct these histories? Race and privilege have all but been left out of consideration in these studies. As Person shows, diplomatic reports were full of dismissive and often smug remarks. Although he is unable to explore within the confines of this single article the extent of these biases or how these fit into broader cross-cultural relations, it is clear that a concern with the historical conditions for the production of these documents—in particular, the politics of racial representation—will be crucial for any future research based on them. As we all know by now, cross-cultural writing reflects not just on the subject but also on the writer—a dynamic to which self-proclaimed socialists, whatever their public claims to the contrary, were not exempt.Several of the articles in the special issue, however, are based on another source base that has been conventionally neglected and only recently taken up by a growing number of researchers. These are texts—newspapers, magazines, and monographs—printed in Pyongyang under the official of the Korean Workers’ and published by various of or These as well as publications of various make up the rich and varied reading culture of North Koreans in their In this special issue, authors these sources, from stories to quantitative data, magazines, and Many more could be to this sources are available to researchers not in archives but in that have been open to the In the United materials as part of a project to publications for intelligence are now at the of Many of its especially remain Moscow’s former now the as a type of for North Korean the including Korean of Soviet texts, and even Other in and the of also offer while the in former socialist in and are more have become available for of through the of in South Korea is more because of National Security Laws that to with North Korea, as Kim in the of her Seoul has more than many other some materials are available in such as the one at the National which more history. Many more sources in A history of how National Security Laws have shaped access to materials and how the Korean produced types of by scholars with special access to intelligence sources, especially in the early to be work like that done by Kim on the early funding in the of North Korean studies needs to be for even as this international field as sources, could into these to a rich array of in fact, than any single could in a These texts, however, have recently remained as more than propaganda without much research much about the dominant of the North Korea With a on and there was that such materials to offer who were more in about and Sonia Ryang called this the of North Korean The for the for the of and the of the of for or the of the name just a not much information relevant to the lines of publications such as the the or the might be into for the of examining the and of yet for the most part these remain This is now lines of become more these sources have shown their for these new the last scholars have more than any others these documents to an assortment of Ranging from the early work of which of changes in and institutions over to treatment of North Korean beyond of and this work has led the even in the of South Korea’s National Security In a of how much is in the by this Kim is a with from these largely Pyongyang-based sources that now numbers in the of as pointed out in her roundtable contribution to the the number of from the to today more than works on from to to of which is available to of the peninsula, a of scholars working in the United States such as Kim, and Kim an article in this special and in such as and have taken up this of a archive to shift from the elite politics and security on this scholarship, the articles in this special issue confirm a future more varied approaches to North Korea that arguably are no within a single that concerns with security and elite politics This is most rather than or see documents published in Pyongyang as the authors in this special issue them as a part of a more expansive North Korea archive. of them would no readily that these published with the of the are of propaganda and the of the regime. Yet their research on reading them and the as Kim it in her to the of Gregg Brazinsky on this point in his treatment of a different yet type of soldier source whose production has been by the official of a to its raises one of the of these sources, relationship between official and the of have tended to he points out, that that reflects the official narrative was written under and or only with official as truths or, as he inner or Brazinsky shows that a of such materials of their scholarly of the of in these texts, which like any other of documents their own idiosyncratic with they can to power of official in shaping the of the in ways more than the Cold War of while also showing the ways the as authors of this and used it to their own have similar in to archives in the In the study of it was these types of published sources that the early accounts of largely by and cultural historians decades and the opening of Soviet Yet do not have to so to such a of a still a time when documents published by the were as virtually no research for what up the was still called the of Korean history. the with which scholars the same documents that a generation is in As the articles in this special issue it is now the turn of sources published in Pyongyang to be taken for more than their propaganda is not to that these sources, like any historical do not have their own are after all by the are often sponsored by or are and by and written in a to have no space in such challenges such just one from just after the Korean with the of might be in the but it to get outside the categories in which the is might that what in their but remain as to the of those let alone their broader political is known about the politics behind these it can be that by the early individual publications the emerging of Kim Il for his others did reasons for this of these mean the early of the was not but by some Or could this be as to on the part of These can be but into the of Other issues by the regime as of new for or not of as to the of the in these As more research is done these sources, more will become clear about not just the possibilities but also the limits of their the those are more varied and than in work that published sources as that North Korean claims about the nature of or that the history and of to a single is also to point out that the articles in this special issue are with more than just sources, written or are also on their sources, both old and with novel questions, in the disciplines of each of the at the North Korea of a in Seoul will the with to for a North Korea Such have produced many yet they on a very that North Korea is best understood through its other a so that it a special methodology all of its Such an to research on an of North Korea’s own propaganda that it is any other in the in of a articles in this special issue work on a that the approaches of our disciplines are up to the of studying North Korea without to In other North Korea as a subject of scholarship no it or critical research, attention to the history of our conceptual the biases of the sources, and the historical of the twentieth-century peninsula, cannot to not always The between the and the particular, from an on North Korea’s to within which any be in this the study of North Korea to and approaches. True, there is no access to formerly of documents to the way it is in East Germany, where now the archive is can interviews be done inside the in the Chinese have been to better the possibilities of the 1950s Yet there is no time for to for North Korean archives to open or to be for

IntroductionThe KIC is of interest to the United States and the two Koreas for six primary reasons.3 First, South Korea wants the United States to consider products made in the KIC as South Korean in origin for the purposes of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Second, the KIC has become a growing source of foreign exchange for North Korea. Third, the KIC is part of South Korea's strategy to ease tensions with North Korea. Fourth, the KIC is an important part of the North Korean economic reforms. Fifth, the KIC raises issues of security, human rights, and working conditions in North Korea. Sixth, U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean companies to ship to the KIC certain U.S.-made equipment that is currently subject to U.S. export controls.Table 1 shows the brief history of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The KIC started in August 2000, with the signing of a contract between Hyundai Corporation and North Korea's Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. In November 2002, the KIC took a big step forward when the North Korean government released the Regulations for the Kaesong Industrial District. During the three years of its preparation, the North and South Korean governments worked on ensuring free passage across the DMZ, and on establishing tax, accounting, banking, and labor laws to be applied to the KIC. Although the KIC is geographically located in North Korea, general North Korean laws do not apply; instead, it is governed by a special set of laws. A ground-breaking ceremony was held in Kaesong to officially inaugurate the KIC in 2003; in June 2004, the first 15 companies set up their plants; and by December 2004, the first Kaesong-made products rolled off the production lines.4Table 2 shows that South Korean firms in the KIC produced a total of $525 million dollars in goods during the period 2005-2008, and exported $96 million of their output for the same period, 18 percent of their total production. All products made in the KIC are shipped to South Korea for sale there, or for export via South Korean customs clearance. The major export destinations are China, Europe, the Middle East, and Russia. Companies in the KIC use labor-intensive manufacturing processes, with raw materials and intermediate goods supplied from South Korea to Kaesong for final assembly. As the KIC has expanded, however, there has been more scope for companies to produce some of their manufacturing inputs locally. Furthermore, the number of North Korean workers in the KIC increased from 7,621 in 2005 to 38,931 in 2008, a five-fold increase. However, the KIC has faced a most serious challenge since February 2008, when a conservative government replaced the liberal governments that had ruled South Korea for ten years.As of February 28, 2009, 93 South Korean firms were operating in the KIC, with a total of 36,650 North Korean workers along with 952 South Korean workers; it is important to note that there were 1,370 South Korean workers and about 40,000 North Korean workers before North Korea began its border clampdown in November 2008. Another 45 factories are under construction. The project was supposed to be carried out in three stages for years to come; the first stage was well under way and was expected to be completed in 2010, and the complex was supposed to employ 100,000 North Korean workers and have 450 tenant companies by the end of 2010. However, such rosy projections about the KIC ended when North Korea cut the reconciliation dialogue with South Korea after its President Lee, a conservative, took office in February 2008. Lee pledged to get tougher with North Korea, which refuses to abandon its nuclear program. Lee has intentionally raised awareness of North Korea's human rights problems and called for efforts to scrap the nuclear programs. In response to such tough policies by South Korea, North Korea has adopted a series of hard-line policies against South Korea.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. …