Comparison of bioethical views in the work of Peter Singer and in ethics of social consequences

Abstract

The present paper compares the ethics of Peter Singer and the ethics of social consequences in bioethics. As part of the discussion on the ethics of social consequences, attention is mainly focused on the theory of its founder, Vasil Gluchman, and the works of his selected students. First, the selected bioethical views of Peter Singer are analyzed, and his ethics of preference utilitarianism are presented through the prism of his understanding of the person. In this sense, Singer’s view on the issues of abortion and infanticide is presented. Furthermore, the study deals with Singer’s views on the killing of animals and people regarding his criticism of speciesism and his prioritization of the preference criterion. Attention is also paid to Singer’s view on euthanasia. The study also presents the bioethical views of representatives of the ethics of social consequences, namely non-utilitarian consequentialism. It focuses on the question of to what extent genetics, according to Gluchman, determines morality and whether the protection of life is an absolute value for the ethics of social consequences. The paper also analyzes the abortion issue from the point of view of the ethics of social consequences. Selected bioethical attitudes of the ethics of social consequences proponents are also presented to compare the two concepts and determine the ontological fundaments on which Singer relies. Furthermore, the paper discusses Singer’s concept of the person, claiming that the ethics of social consequences argues for human dignity and positive social consequences for humans. Singer does not work with the concept of human dignity. In the paper, preference utilitarianism is not considered a hybrid ethical theory, unlike the ethics of social consequences. Preference utilitarianism and ethics of social consequences accept abortion and euthanasia in particular cases. The ethics of social consequences accepts them only if life contradicts human dignity, and preferential utilitarianism if it aligns with the person’s preferences or if it is not a person. Gluchman admits the solutions above as altruistic help to the suffering person. However, the ethics of social consequences does not consider the animal a person, nor does it condone infanticide, as does preference utilitarianism.