Comparing Forms of Common Property Resource and Collective Goods Organizations Operating Water Markets in the Colorado Lower Arkansas River Basin

Abstract

AbstractWhat sociological attributes characterize the form of an enduring social organization that empowers individually rational self‐interested actors to provide themselves with a common property or collective goods resource? To address this question, two common property/collective goods organizations for water management—located in the Arkansas River Basin of Colorado—were compared. The method was to assess attributes of each organization against those of conceptual benchmarks that reflect a tradition of common property resource and collective goods organizational research. The organizations were the Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Program and the Lower Arkansas Valley Water Management Association. The Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Program lacked the characteristics that theorists advancing the conceptual benchmarks have hypothesized as important to success. The pilot program also failed to generate local interest. The program was decommissioned in 2005 after the pilot trial period concluded. The Lower Arkansas Water Management Association possessed the attributes. It was considered a success as defined by member support for the organization and the capacity of that organization to re‐time flows on the Arkansas River. This program has been operating a water market in the lower Arkansas River Basin for over 30 years and continues to successfully move groundwater and surface water around the landscape. Implications for policy and theory are addressed.