Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash equilibrium in the framework of an Aggregative Game (a generalization of the Cournot model). We assume a strong concavity condition which implies that the best reply function of any player is decreasing in the sum of the strategies of the remaining players (i.e. strategic substitution). Our results generalize and unify those known in the Cournot model.
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